The Gun Control Act (GCA) of 1968 provides for a list of persons prohibited from possessing firearms. Codified at 18 USC § 922(g), the list has been amended several times over the years, but generally it remains as legislated in 1968.
Of interest today is category 4 which pertains to people who are mentally unwell. 922(g)(4) (prohibits from possessing firearms everyone “who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution.”). What the statute does not do is define the operative terms “adjudicated as a mental defective” and “committed to a mental institution.”
Of interest today is category 4 which pertains to people who are mentally unwell. 922(g)(4) (prohibits from possessing firearms everyone “who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution.”). What the statute does not do is define the operative terms “adjudicated as a mental defective” and “committed to a mental institution.”
Historical Definitions
Oddly enough, the ATF did not seek to define these terms until the mid 1990s. Thus for 25 to 30 years these terms were left to the courts for meanings. And generally this was not a problem, de facto, because there was no federal background check system, no central databases, and no mechanism for states, the entities which by and large adjudicate and commit persons, to report such to the Federal Government.
Starting in 1993, the Brady Act mandated the development of Federal databases of prohibited persons and background checks before the purchase of a firearm. With this, the ATF proposed and ultimately enacted a definition of these terms in the Code of Federal Regulations.
Tensions in the Definition
During the rulemaking process for defining these terms, two other federal agencies participated creating the tension which ultimately led us to today’s proposed rule.
First, the Department of Veteran Affairs (VA) commented / lobbied for including within these definitions persons which the VA had identified as having a “mental incompetency.” These persons “lack[] the mental capacity to contract or to manage his or her own affairs, including disbursement of funds without limitation.” 38 CFR 3.53(a). If a veteran meets this definition, the VA appoints a fiduciary to receive and handle that veteran’s monetary payments from the VA.
In 1997 the ATF accepted the VA’s position that these persons were within the meaning of the statutory prohibition of 922(g)(4) and thus included them in the CFR definition stripping these veterans of their Second Amendment rights.
Second, the Department of Defense also argued to include in the definition of adjudicated as a mental defective persons found incompetent to stand trial. The ATF agreed that these persons should fall within the definition of adjudicated as a mental defective.
The inclusion of veterans with an appointed fiduciary as prohibited persons started the building of tension. This tension increased around 2009 to 2017 when the Social Security administration began the process of reporting as mental defective persons who have a Representative Payee appointed. Initially, in 2009, the SSA determined that its process did not meet the requirements of 922(g)(4) and declined to make any reports to the federal database system. However, in 2010, under Obama, the ATF asserted otherwise and caused the SSA to begin a rule making process to establish a procedure for reporting persons to the federal databases as prohibited from possessing firearms. This rulemaking culminated in a December 19, 2016 rule; issued in the twilight of the Obama administration. In a rare act of Congressional defiance of bureaucracy, Congress, under President Trump in his first term, disapproved of the final rule on February 28, 2017 preventing the rule from going into effect.
With this victory, tension continued to build for Congress to address the systematic disarming of veterans who were competent, but could not manage their government benefits. In 2024, Congress prohibited the VA from using appropriated funds from reporting to NICS veterans assigned a fiduciary. This congressional prohibition continues to today.
In 1997 the ATF accepted the VA’s position that these persons were within the meaning of the statutory prohibition of 922(g)(4) and thus included them in the CFR definition stripping these veterans of their Second Amendment rights.
Second, the Department of Defense also argued to include in the definition of adjudicated as a mental defective persons found incompetent to stand trial. The ATF agreed that these persons should fall within the definition of adjudicated as a mental defective.
The inclusion of veterans with an appointed fiduciary as prohibited persons started the building of tension. This tension increased around 2009 to 2017 when the Social Security administration began the process of reporting as mental defective persons who have a Representative Payee appointed. Initially, in 2009, the SSA determined that its process did not meet the requirements of 922(g)(4) and declined to make any reports to the federal database system. However, in 2010, under Obama, the ATF asserted otherwise and caused the SSA to begin a rule making process to establish a procedure for reporting persons to the federal databases as prohibited from possessing firearms. This rulemaking culminated in a December 19, 2016 rule; issued in the twilight of the Obama administration. In a rare act of Congressional defiance of bureaucracy, Congress, under President Trump in his first term, disapproved of the final rule on February 28, 2017 preventing the rule from going into effect.
With this victory, tension continued to build for Congress to address the systematic disarming of veterans who were competent, but could not manage their government benefits. In 2024, Congress prohibited the VA from using appropriated funds from reporting to NICS veterans assigned a fiduciary. This congressional prohibition continues to today.
ATF’s Current Analysis
ATF, looking to congressional action, attempts to better understand what Congress means by the 922(g)(4) prohibition. First, based on Congress’s actions, it is apparent that the VA and SSA process does not rise to a level sufficient enough to trigger these prohibitions. Therefore the ATF proposes tweaking the definition to exclude persons who have limited competency impairment of only minor functions, such as handling government provided benefits. In this case, appointment of a person to handle this role would not trigger a prohibition under 922(g)(4).
In accomplishing this, the ATF determined that historically the two terms, “adjudicated as a mental defective” and “committed to a mental institution,” were treated as synonyms. However, this is incorrect. Congress joined the terms with an “or,” and it is clear that persons can be adjudicated a mental defective without being committed or can be committed without being adjudicated a mental defective.
First, the ATF examined the historical definitions of mental defective and determined that these definitions referred primarily to congenital conditions. Conditions that develop later in life, such as dementia or mental illness, only arise to a mental defect when the condition becomes permanent and the person is in need of someone to make daily care decisions for them; i.e. a guardian.
Second the ATF looked towards some of the persons currently included in the definition of mental defective, such as persons not competent to stand trial, and determined that those persons did not meet the historical definition of mental defective. However, these persons were generally committed to a mental institution for care and treatment because of their condition.
Seeing that the current use of mental defective over includes persons, and that sometimes these persons would be better classified as committed to a mental institution, the ATF proposed clarifying that the terms are in fact different and that some persons Congress intended to disarm better fit in the definition of committed to a mental institution. Therefore the ATF moved several examples of prohibited persons from the term adjudicated as a mental defective and included them in a new standalone definition for committed to a mental institution.
First, the ATF examined the historical definitions of mental defective and determined that these definitions referred primarily to congenital conditions. Conditions that develop later in life, such as dementia or mental illness, only arise to a mental defect when the condition becomes permanent and the person is in need of someone to make daily care decisions for them; i.e. a guardian.
Second the ATF looked towards some of the persons currently included in the definition of mental defective, such as persons not competent to stand trial, and determined that those persons did not meet the historical definition of mental defective. However, these persons were generally committed to a mental institution for care and treatment because of their condition.
Seeing that the current use of mental defective over includes persons, and that sometimes these persons would be better classified as committed to a mental institution, the ATF proposed clarifying that the terms are in fact different and that some persons Congress intended to disarm better fit in the definition of committed to a mental institution. Therefore the ATF moved several examples of prohibited persons from the term adjudicated as a mental defective and included them in a new standalone definition for committed to a mental institution.
Intended Effect
ATF by and large does not intend to change the number of persons prohibited by 922(g)(4) under this rule. While the ATF does clarify that veterans with a fiduciary or social security beneficiaries with a representative payee are not prohibited persons, Congress has already acted to prevent these persons from being included in the database of prohibited persons. ATF’s definition serves to align the CFR definition with congressional action by requiring due process for an adjudication and requiring, generally, that for an adjudication as a mental defective to arise to the level of a prohibitor a guardian must be appointed.
Other persons removed from the definition of adjudicated as a mental defective are, by-and-large, added to the definition of committed to a mental institution. The ATF even asks for public comment to ensure that it is not mistakenly removing from the list of prohibited persons persons who are currently prohibited. (Albeit with the noted exception of those persons who only need help handling government benefits.)
Scroll Up
Other persons removed from the definition of adjudicated as a mental defective are, by-and-large, added to the definition of committed to a mental institution. The ATF even asks for public comment to ensure that it is not mistakenly removing from the list of prohibited persons persons who are currently prohibited. (Albeit with the noted exception of those persons who only need help handling government benefits.)
Nuances in South Carolina
While federal law prohibits firearm possession by certain persons, it depends upon state law to determine when a person qualifies for the list of prohibited persons. This can create odd and interesting situations as the federal understanding of procedures does not always align with actual state procedure.
One of those situations relevant here is the meaning of “committed to a mental institution” in relation to the South Carolina practice of committing a person to “involuntary outpatient treatment.” Historically, South Carolina has treated someone who was committed to “involuntary outpatient treatment” as a prohibited person. However, as the proposed rule points out, such persons likely do not meet the historic definition of a mental defective. As the proposed rule is drafted, these persons would not meet the definition of mental defective because they do not have a guardian appointed.
The next question is, does “involuntary outpatient treatment” trigger the prohibition based on “committed to a mental institution.” The two do not seem synonymous. At a most basic, involuntary outpatient treatment does not place the person in the charge of a mental institution. In this context, to commit means to confine a person, and a person subject to involuntary outpatient treatment, by the very term outpatient, is not confined to an institution. (It is difficult to rationalize how a person is ‘confined’ to outpatient treatment as the very idea of outpatient implies the coming and going.) Rather, the person is ordered to get treatment, but that very treatment has a voluntary aspect in that the person could choose not to go. (And face the legal consequences thereof.) Juxtapose this to a person confined to a mental institution who may be restrained and held to force treatment upon them.
Logically, there is a reason to think that Congress would prohibit persons committed to a mental institution without meaning to prohibit persons ordered to outpatient treatment. The latter have not risen to the level of dangerousness that our laws think it necessary to deny their liberty interest. Committed to a mental institution is like confinement to prison in that both removes a person’s liberty interest, in part, to protect the general public from the person. The removal of the liberty interest is likely the best justification, and due process assurance, we have for removing a person’s Second Amendment right.
It is worth noting that commitment to a mental institution and involuntary outpatient treatment are not mutually exclusive. Like jail and probation, it is possible to be ordered to both. In such instance, the question is avoided because the commitment to a mental institution creates the Second Amendment prohibition. For those persons who are not committed to a mental institution, but are rather only ordered to outpatient treatment, the proposed rule will tee up a possible court fight to determine if involuntary outpatient treatment is sufficient enough to meet the federal definitions of prohibited persons.
A second place with interesting application is the person who can live independently but still needs a guardian. The proposed rule explicitly accounts for someone who has a physical condition, such as dementia. In these cases, the person must “have reached the functional equivalent to that of a person with an intellectual disability and have a guardian appointed.” South Carolina procedure appoints a guardian whenever any basic right is removed from a person. The question becomes, has the person reached the functional equivalent of an intellectual disability.
One of those situations relevant here is the meaning of “committed to a mental institution” in relation to the South Carolina practice of committing a person to “involuntary outpatient treatment.” Historically, South Carolina has treated someone who was committed to “involuntary outpatient treatment” as a prohibited person. However, as the proposed rule points out, such persons likely do not meet the historic definition of a mental defective. As the proposed rule is drafted, these persons would not meet the definition of mental defective because they do not have a guardian appointed.
The next question is, does “involuntary outpatient treatment” trigger the prohibition based on “committed to a mental institution.” The two do not seem synonymous. At a most basic, involuntary outpatient treatment does not place the person in the charge of a mental institution. In this context, to commit means to confine a person, and a person subject to involuntary outpatient treatment, by the very term outpatient, is not confined to an institution. (It is difficult to rationalize how a person is ‘confined’ to outpatient treatment as the very idea of outpatient implies the coming and going.) Rather, the person is ordered to get treatment, but that very treatment has a voluntary aspect in that the person could choose not to go. (And face the legal consequences thereof.) Juxtapose this to a person confined to a mental institution who may be restrained and held to force treatment upon them.
Logically, there is a reason to think that Congress would prohibit persons committed to a mental institution without meaning to prohibit persons ordered to outpatient treatment. The latter have not risen to the level of dangerousness that our laws think it necessary to deny their liberty interest. Committed to a mental institution is like confinement to prison in that both removes a person’s liberty interest, in part, to protect the general public from the person. The removal of the liberty interest is likely the best justification, and due process assurance, we have for removing a person’s Second Amendment right.
It is worth noting that commitment to a mental institution and involuntary outpatient treatment are not mutually exclusive. Like jail and probation, it is possible to be ordered to both. In such instance, the question is avoided because the commitment to a mental institution creates the Second Amendment prohibition. For those persons who are not committed to a mental institution, but are rather only ordered to outpatient treatment, the proposed rule will tee up a possible court fight to determine if involuntary outpatient treatment is sufficient enough to meet the federal definitions of prohibited persons.
A second place with interesting application is the person who can live independently but still needs a guardian. The proposed rule explicitly accounts for someone who has a physical condition, such as dementia. In these cases, the person must “have reached the functional equivalent to that of a person with an intellectual disability and have a guardian appointed.” South Carolina procedure appoints a guardian whenever any basic right is removed from a person. The question becomes, has the person reached the functional equivalent of an intellectual disability.
Interestingly, the ATF looks to pre 1968 definitions and text to examine types of intellectual disabilities, how the same are labeled, and what are the general functional limitations of each. Mental defectives are marked with “subnormal intelligence levels descending on a scale of ‘moronity, imbecility, and idiocy.’” Proposed Rule. A mental defective may also be described as feebleminded. Meanwhile, intellectual disabilities may be classified as mild, moderate, severe and profound. In mental ages, a person with mild intellectual disability functions at ages 9 to 12, moderate at 6 to 9, severe, at 3 to 6, and profound at under 3 years of age. If trying to understand these rules makes you ask “what kind of idiots do we have in congress?” please refrain from ranking your congressman on a scale of mild to profound as this is insulting to those with intellectual disabilities.
The proposed rule defines an intellectual disability based on either IQ, or in lieu of such findings, a judicial determination regarding cognitive and functional deficits. But importantly, the person must also be “incapable of living independently.” Thus, if a person has dementia, and a guardian is appointed, that person may still not meet the definition of a prohibited person if they are capable of living independently. This limitation is included to explicitly exclude persons who only have a fiduciary appointed to assist with financial matters such as the VA fiduciary or SSA Representative Payee.
Practical Effects
I have seen very few instances where a person is appointed a guardian while maintaining the ability to live independently. While these do happen, the number of persons who may have a guardian, but avoid the definition of mental defective because they can live by themselves, will be very limited.
The involuntary outpatient treatment is of more interest. Many clients over the years have been ordered to outpatient treatment without ever being committed to a mental institution. (Even more are only held for observation which is explicitly excluded from the definition of committed to a mental institution.) This is not uncommon when a person has a drug issue or other mental imbalance that needs treatment, but not around the clock care. This is a question which is sure to arise if the new rule is adopted as proposed.
The involuntary outpatient treatment is of more interest. Many clients over the years have been ordered to outpatient treatment without ever being committed to a mental institution. (Even more are only held for observation which is explicitly excluded from the definition of committed to a mental institution.) This is not uncommon when a person has a drug issue or other mental imbalance that needs treatment, but not around the clock care. This is a question which is sure to arise if the new rule is adopted as proposed.
